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REPLY TO MAURO DORATO
hilary putnaM 
(1) i believe that yuval Dolev, Mauro Dorato, and steven savitt are absolutely right, 
and that the question whether the past and the future are “real” is a pseudo-question. 
in my view, what still survives of my 1967 “time and physical Geometry”, after their 
criticisms, is that the philosophical position that statements about the present and the 
past have determinate truth values, whereas statements about the future do not, is in-
coherent. But, like these three authors, i am not convinced by a well known criticism 
due to howard stein. stein’s objection to my argument was that i overlooked the pos-
sibility of relativizing the notion of reality (or “having become”, in his terminology). 
on his proposal, what “has become” relative to an observer at a time is what is in the 
“here-now” of that observer or else lies in the past light cone of that observer, and 
this is a relativistically invariant notion. in my view, stein simply misses the issue i 
was addressing, which is whether future events are real in the standard metaphysical 
understanding of “real”, on which what is “real” is precisely supposed to be mind-and-
observer-independent. at best, stein’s view, like Dorato’s, rejects my question, but if one 
is going to reject the question, i prefer to be up front about that rejection, in the way 
Dorato is.
let me mention that, as an immediate consequence of the lorentz formulas, the time 
displacement of events at a distance depends not only on their relative speeds, but also 
on their relative distance, and the effect is significant even when the relative velocities 
of the observers is small relative to the speed of light. in fact, if we choose a star system 
that is only ten light years from here, then if i am in singapore (roughly on the Equa-
tor), and my friend Jack smart is at the antipodal point from me (also near the Equa-
tor), so that our relative velocities due to the Earth’s rotation are of the order of 3200 
km per hour, and each of us chooses a rest system in which he himself is at rest, we will 
differ about when an event in that distant system took place by several minutes! 
(2) as to what Mauro Dorato says about the relationship between the manifest image 
and the scientific image, i want to say that the manifest image can  certainly be cor-
rected by science—but not only by science: philosophical reflection has long been a 
major source of correction.
let us begin with the original form of the idea of two incompatible “images”—Edding-
ton’s celebrated “two tables”. according to Eddington, there is a table that physics has 
shown to not really be solid because it is mainly empty space, and therefore the table of 
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the manifest image is not identical with the table of the scientific image. That argument 
depends on assuming that the ordinary language term “solid” has a semantics which 
makes almost all of its descriptive occurrences false. But what kind of linguistic meth-
odology is that? Doesn’t it make more sense to claim that there is a sense of “solid” 
in which to say that something is solid isn’t to say anything about its microstructure? 
in fact there is a field of physics called “solid state physics”—but if physics has really 
shown there are no solids, how can there be a solid state physics? physics may have 
shown there are no ghosts, but it doesn’t go on to create a field of physics called “ghost 
state physics”, or “ectoplasm physics”!
similarly, there are exaggerated claims sometimes made by psychologists about the al-
leged falsity of “folk psychology” (another part of the “manifest image”). it is very easy 
to construct clever experiments to show that people sometimes rationalize and invent 
a reason why they did something, which wasn’t actually the cause of their behavior. 
But to conclude that we don’t really eat because we are hungry, we don’t really turn on 
the water in the bathtub because we want to take a bath, we don’t really take an unpleas-
ant job because we need money, we don’t really try to impress that person because we are 
in love with them, etc., is nonsense.
nevertheless, i do expect that science will sometimes correct folk psychology. in fact, 
it already has. here is an example: i know that there are a lot of mistakes in freud. 
he had the typical Viennese Gelehrter’s arrogant sureness about his own opinions, 
plus the great psychologists’ over-ambitiousness (recall that in the Treatise of Human 
Nature,  hume claimed to have done for psychology what newton did for physics!). 
freud vastly overgeneralized from a small number of cases, he was overly reductionist, 
and so on. But the unconscious is still important. and i think folk psychology did un-
dergo a correction as a result of psychoanalysis. Theophrastus, the head of the lyceum 
after aristotle, is the author of a book called The Characters. reading it, i was struck 
by his sketch of what we would call a “neurotic behavior”, a sketch of someone who 
has a compulsion to spread rumors, and even misses the trial of a civil suit he himself 
has brought, being so busy with his irrational behavior. Theophrastus’s description of 
this behavior was marvelous, but when it comes to explanation he just threw up his 
hands, saying, as it were, “utterly inexplicable, utterly irrational behavior”. But even the 
man on the street now appeals to unconscious motivation in such a case.  in fact, any 
branch of psychology may lead to some corrections in so-called “folk psychology”. But 
notions from folk psychology, including the central notions of belief and desire, remain 
indispensable. 
The specialized perspectives of the sciences can be overly “reductionist” at times,  to 
be sure, but they are also the perspectives from which we demolish, for instance, the 
pseudo-science of racism. in fact, the most powerful destructive criticisms of so-called 
“racial science” came from the modern synthesis of genetics and evolutionary theory. 
so, i am opposed to any view which sets science and ordinary language in opposition 
to each other. There are times in which ordinary language does need corrections—
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from science, and, as i said before, also sometimes from philosophy. forgive now what 
may look like a digression.
 When Ernst Gombrich was 26 years old, he had a friend, a publisher, who said to him 
“i had someone lined up to write a short history of the world for children, and he quit 
on me—it has to be written in six weeks”. Gombrich replied “i’ll do it”. (he needed the 
money, was in love with a girl  he wanted to marry, had a phD in art history and no 
job.) and he wrote his amazing A Little History of the World. his short account of what 
was good about Enlightenment is particularly important. Gombrich begins by listing 
things that everyone thought they “knew” in the years before the Enlightenment—
things like “of course” you have to beat children, “of course” it is all right to beat your 
wife, “of course” you have to burn witches, and so on. The point Gombrich wished to 
make is that the central virtue of  Enlightenment was tolerance. 
so, here is a case of ordinary language being corrected—the use of the term “witch” got 
“corrected”, for example. But the Enlightenment’s attack on superstition required also 
support from science. in this case the philosophy and the science worked together. 
one needed both philosophical arguments and a new view of the facts. so, it is not 
that the whole job can be done by science, because science can be used by anybody. 
late capitalism has developed a technology of manipulating public opinion—which is 
a scientific technology. so, there’s nothing intrinsically good or bad about science. But 
there is a moral duty to fight pernicious errors. Michele Moody-adams wrote a book 
in 1997 called Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy in which 
she does a beautiful job describing what she calls “affected ignorance”—the deliberate 
“not knowing” the things that you have a moral obligation to know. i think that this is 
a tremendously important notion: the prevalence of affected ignorance. and of course 
the evil person would then try to make other people affectedly ignorant. 
so, science can be enlisted in bad causes, and exposing that it is bad science is very 
important. We should show that those negative stereotypes are wrong, and wickedly 
wrong, and combat affected ignorance of the facts that refute those stereotypes. i would 
say that destroying those stereotypes is itself a moral obligation, since the presence of 
a stereotype which is factually nonsense in the majority of the population, or even in a 
significant minority, is itself a significant form of oppression. i think that (and in this 
i agree with habermas) it is a feature of discriminatory oppressive positions—those of 
the racists, the oppressors of women, the defenders of cruelty to children and so on—
that they always invent facts that are not facts. They encourage affected ignorance of 
the truth, and here truth is on the side of justice.
in sum, i think that when the so-called “manifest image” is wrong, it can and must be 
corrected, but there is no principled incompatibility between the scientific image and 
the manifest image. sellars and Eddington were just wrong about that.
